We propose a concept to study the stability of social and economic networks when players are farsighted and allocations are determined endogenously. A set of networks is a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with bargaining if there exists an allocation rule and a bargaining threat such that (i) there is no farsighted improving path from one network inside the set to another network inside the set, (ii) from any network outside the set there is a farsighted improving path to some network inside the set, (iii) the value of each network is allocated among players so that players su¤er or bene…t equally from being linked to each other compared to the allocation they would obtain at their respective credible bargaining threat. We show that the set of strongly e¢ cient networks is the unique von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with bargaining if the allocation rule is anonymous and component e¢ cient and the value function is top convex. Moreover, the componentwise egalitarian allocation rule emerges endogenously.
Introduction
The organization of agents into networks and groups plays an important role in the determination of the outcome of many social and economic interactions. 1 A simple way to analyze the networks that one might expect to emerge in the long run is to examine the requirement that players do not bene…t from altering the structure of the network. An example of such a condition is the pairwise stability notion de…ned by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) . A network is pairwise stable if no player bene…ts from severing one of her links and no two players bene…t from adding a link between them. Pairwise stability is a myopic de…nition. Players are not farsighted in the sense that they do not forecast how others might react to their actions. For instance, the adding or severing of one link might lead to subsequent addition or severing of another link. If players have very good information about how others might react to changes in the network, then these are things one wants to allow for in the de…nition of the stability concept. For instance, a network could be stable because players might not add a link that appears valuable to them given the current network, as that might in turn lead to the formation of other links and ultimately lower the payo¤s of the original players.
Allocation rules keep track of how value is allocated among the players in the network. The allocation rule may simply be the utility that players directly get, accounting for the costs and bene…ts of being linked to other players in the network.
But there are many situations where the allocation rule is the result of some bargaining among linking players. However, most network formation models are such that both the network formation process and the allocation of value among players in a network are separated and the players are not farsighted.
In this paper we address the question of which networks one might expect to emerge in the long run when the players are farsighted and the allocation of value among players is determined simultaneously with the network formation as players may bargain over their shares of value within their component. Hence, we introduce the notion of von Neumann-Morgenstern farsighted stability with bargaining.
A set of networks is a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with bargaining if there exists an allocation rule and a bargaining threat such that (i) there is no farsighted improving path from one network inside the set to another equilibrium to be e¢ cient. 5 Mutuswami and Winter (2002) have proposed subscription mechanisms for network formation when the costs from linking are publicly known but the bene…ts from linking are not known to the social planner. Their mechanism is similar to Currarini and Morelli (2000) sequential network formation game 6 and leads to the formation of an e¢ cient network. 7 The payo¤s in Currarini and Morelli (2000) and Mutuswami and Winter (2002) are endogenously generated but are highly asymmetric and sensitive to the order in which players make proposals. More recently, Bloch and Jackson (2007) have studied the role played by transfers payments in the formation of networks. They have investigated whether di¤erent forms of transfers (direct transfers, indirect transfers or contingent transfers) can solve the con ‡ict between stability and e¢ ciency when there are network externalities that usually lead to the emergence of ine¢ cient networks when trans- 5 However, if the network formation process is simultaneous, then there are value functions that satisfy size monotonicity for which ine¢ cient equilibria can arise. 6 Each player, when it is her turn, proposes the set of links she wants to form and her cost contribution. Once all proposals have been made, the social planner selects the network to be formed and the cost contributions of the players. 7 Slikker and van den Nouweland (2000) have studied the formation of communication networks
with endogenous payo¤ division but with a strategic form game. Similarly, Matsubayashi and Yamakawa (2004) have proposed a strategic form game to share the cost of building the network in a model where the bene…ts of the network decays as the distance among players increases.
fers are not feasible. 8 But all these papers have assumed either simultaneous move games (with myopic players) or sequential move games (with …nite horizon and speci…c ordering). We go further by looking at the endogenous determination of payo¤s together with network formation in presence of farsighted players.
The paper most closely related to our work is Navarro (2013a) who has studied a dynamic process of network formation that is represented by means of a stationary transition probability matrix. Forward-looking players have a common discount factor and receive payo¤s at each moment in time according to a stationary allocation rule. Three properties are imposed on the allocation rule and the transition probability. First, the allocation rule together with the transition probability are expected fair. That is, for each link in the network both players involved in the link bene…t or su¤er the same stream of discounted expected payo¤s from cutting their link at time zero. Second, the allocation rule is component e¢ cient. That is, the value of each component is shared among the members of the component. Third, the expected fair allocation rule and transition probability is a pairwise network formation procedure. That is, the probability that a link is added (or deleted) is positive only if the stream of discounted expected payo¤s for the players involved in adding (or deleting) the link is positive. Navarro (2013a) has shown that if the common discount factor is small enough (i.e. players are close to be myopic), then there exists an allocation rule together with a transition probability matrix such that the allocation rule is component e¢ cient and the allocation rule together with the transition probability is an expected fair pairwise network formation procedure. 9 Here, we rather adopt the stability approach because the noncooperative or dynamic approach is much sensitive to the speci…cation of the bargaining game and network formation process, whose …ne details (such as how the game ends) can be very important in determining what networks form and how value is allocated.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce some notations, basic properties and de…nitions for networks. In Section 3 we de…ne the notion of von Neumann-Morgenstern farsighted stability with bargaining and we look at the relationship between von Neumann-Morgenstern farsighted stability with bar- 8 They have found that indirect transfers together with contingent transfers are needed to guarantee that e¢ cient networks form. Indirect transfers enable players to take care of positive externalities by subsidizing the formation of links by other players; while contingent transfers enable players to overcome negative externalities by preventing the formation of links 9 Navarro (2013b) has used her dynamic network formation process and her solution concept to investigate the tension between e¢ ciency and stability.
gaining and e¢ ciency of networks. In Section 4 we propose the notion of pairwise farsighted stability with bargaining and we look at its relationship with the von Neumann-Morgenstern farsighted stability with bargaining. In Section 5 we discuss some properties. In particular, we address situations where there are externalities across components and we provide a condition such that the set of e¢ cient networks remains the unique von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with bargaining. In Section 6 we conclude.
Networks, values and allocation rules Networks
Let N = f1; : : : ; ng be the …nite set of players who are connected in some network relationship. The network relationships are reciprocal and the network is thus modeled as a non-directed graph. Players are the nodes in the graph and links indicate bilateral relationships between players. Thus, a network g is simply a list of which pairs of individuals are linked to each other. We write ij 2 g to indicate that i and j are linked under the network g. Let g S be the set of all subsets of S N of size
2.
10 So, g N is the complete network. The set of all possible networks or graphs on N is denoted by G and consists of all subsets of g N : The network obtained by adding link ij to an existing network g is denoted g + ij and the network that results from deleting link ij from an existing network g is denoted g ij. Let gj S = fij j ij 2 g and i 2 S, j 2 Sg. Thus, gj S is the network found deleting all links except those that are between players in S. For any network g, let N (g) = fi j 9 j such that ij 2 gg be the set of players who have at least one link in the network g. The neighborhood of player i is the set of players that i is linked to:
A path in a network g 2 G between i and j is a sequence of players i 1 ; : : : ; i K such that i k i k+1 2 g for each k 2 f1; : : : ; K 1g with i 1 = i and i K = j, and such that each player in the sequence i 1 ; : : : ; i K is distinct. A non-empty network h g is a component of g, if for all i 2 N (h) and j 2 N (h) n fig; there exists a path in h connecting i and j, and for any i 2 N (h) and j 2 N (g), ij 2 g implies ij 2 h.
The set of components of g is denoted by C(g). Let (g) denote the partition of 10 Throughout the paper we use the notation for weak inclusion and for strict inclusion.
Finally, # will refer to the notion of cardinality.
N induced by the network g. That is, S 2 (g) if and only if either there exists
Value functions
A value function is a function v that assigns a value v(S; g) to every network g and every coalition S 2 (g). This value v(S; g) can be perfectly distributed among the players in S. Given v, the total value that can be distributed at network
The set of all possible value functions v is denoted by V. A value function v is component additive (or has no externalities across components) (Jackson and Wolinksky, 1996) if for any g 2 G and S 2 (g), v(S; g) = v(S; gj S ). Component additivity means that the value of a component of the network does not depend on the structure of the network outside the component.
Given a permutation of players and any g 2 G, let g = f (i) (j) j ij 2 gg. Thus, g is a network that is identical to g up to a permutation of the players. A value function v is anonymous (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996) if for any permutation , 
Allocation rules
An allocation rule y is a function that assigns a payo¤ y i (g; v) to player i 2 N from graph g under the value function v 2 V. An allocation rule y is component e¢ cient (Myerson, 1977) if for any g 2 G and S 2 (g), P i2S y i (g; v) = v(S; g).
11
Given a permutation , let v be de…ned by v (S; g)
any g 2 G. An allocation rule y is anonymous (Jackson and Wolinsky, 19996) if for any v, g 2 G and permutation ,
Some prominent allocation rules have been proposed. The egalitarian allocation rule (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996 ) y e is de…ned by y
For a component additive v and network g, the componentwise egalitarian allocation rule (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996) y ce is such that for any S 2 (g) and each i 2 S,
for all g; thus, y ce splits the value v(g) equally among all players if v is not component 11 An allocation rule y is component balanced (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996) if for any component
additive.
Another allocation rule is the Myerson value:
An allocation rule satis…es equal bargaining power if for any component additive v and g 2 G we have 
14 However, the player-based ‡exible network allocation rule rule violates both equal bargaining power and component balance. 15 We now provide an example that illustrates the drawbacks of the Myerson value and the player-based ‡exible network allocation rule. This example also motivates the necessity of determining the allocation rule together with the formation of the network in the long run.
Example 1 The Myerson value. Take N = f1; 2; 3g and the value function de…ned by v(f1; 2; 3g; f12; 13; 23g) = 0, v(f1; 2; 3g; f12; 13g) = 5, v(f1; 2; 3g; f12; 23g) = 12 Navarro (2007) has proposed a component e¢ cient and fair allocation rule when the value of the network can exhibit any type of externalities across its components. 13 Perez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2005) have proposed a sequential mechanism whose subgame perfect equilibria rise to strongly e¢ cient networks and to payo¤s that coincide with Jackson's player-based ‡exible network allocation rule. 14 The monotonic cover of a value function gives the highest value that can be generated by building a network out of a given set of links. 15 Navarro (2010) obtain less than what they could get in f23g, namely y
Players 2 and 3 have a viable outside option but the Myerson value does not take this option into account because f23g is not a subnetwork of f12; 13g. The player-based ‡exible network allocation rule provides a more reasonable allocation than the Myerson value for f12; 13g by giving higher allocations to players 2 and 3 than player 1:
(f12; 13g) and y M V 1 (f12; 13g) = 1=3. However, it gives
(f23g) and y P BF N 1 (f23g) = 4=15 violating component balance. Hence, this allocation is unlikely to emerge at f23g since the value function is component additive and players 2 and 3 transfer some payo¤ to player 1 who does not belong to their component. 
Allocation rules with farsighted players
The equal bargaining power property imposes that, for each link ij in a network g, both players i and j should equally bene…t or su¤er when bargaining over how to allocate value taking as reference network the adjacent subnetwork g ij. Hence, equal bargaining power presumes that players are myopic, not farsighted, in the sense that they do not forecast how others might react if they break the link ij.
For instance, the severing of ij might lead to subsequent severing or addition of another link. Once players are farsighted, equal bargaining power will impose that players equally bene…t or su¤er when bargaining over how to allocate value taking as reference network or bargaining threat, not necessarily adjacent subnetworks, but networks that may be reached from adjacent networks through a sequence of networks when players form or delete links based on the improvement the end network o¤ers relative to the current one.
Von Neumann-Morgenstern farsighted stability with bargaining
We now propose the notion of von Neumann-Morgenstern farsighted stability with bargaining, to predict which networks are likely to emerge and which allocations are going to be agreed upon among farsighted players when allocations and links are determined jointly.
We …rst introduce the notion of farsighted improving path from Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2009) and the notion of bargaining threat. A farsighted improving path is a sequence of networks that can emerge when players form or sever links based on the improvement the end network o¤ers relative to the current network.
Each network in the sequence di¤ers by one link from the previous one. If a link is added, then the two players involved must both prefer the end network to the current network, with at least one of the two strictly preferring the end network. If a link is deleted, then it must be that at least one of the two players involved in the link strictly prefers the end network. Formally, a farsighted improving path from a network g to a network g 0 6 = g is a …nite sequence of graphs g 1 ; : : : ; g K with g 1 = g
and g K = g 0 such that for any k 2 f1; : : : ; K 1g either:
. For a given network g, let F (g) be the set of networks that can be reached by a farsighted improving path from g. Notice that F (g) may contain many networks and that a network g 0 2 F (g) might be the endpoint of several farsighted improving paths starting in g.
A bargaining threat z is a function that assigns to each network g 2 G a network
Intuitively, when player i is negotiating how to share the surplus with other players she is linked to in g, she has in mind the payo¤ she might obtain at some other network, z i (g), not necessarily adjacent to g since players are farsighted.
A set of networks is a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with bargaining if there exists an allocation rule and a bargaining threat such that the following conditions hold. First, there is no farsighted improving path from one network inside the set to another network inside the set (internal stability). Second, from any network outside the set there is a farsighted improving path to some network inside the set (external stability). Third, the value of each network is allocated among players so that players su¤er or bene…t equally from being linked to each other compared to the allocation they would obtain at their respective bargaining threat (equal bargaining power). Fourth, the bargaining threat at each network is credible. Credibility means that the threat can be reached by a farsighted improving path emanating from some network adjacent to the network over which bargaining takes place. Formally, von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets with bargaining are de…ned as follows.
De…nition 1. A set of networks G G is a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly
stable set with bargaining if there exists an allocation rule y and a bargaining threat z such that
Condition (i) in De…nition 1 is the internal stability condition. From any network within G, there is no farsighted improving path leading to some other network in G. Condition (ii) in De…nition 1 requires external stability and implies that the networks within the set are robust to perturbations. From any network outside G, there is a farsighted improving path leading to some network in G. 16 Condition (ii)
implies that if a set of networks is a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable 16 There are some random dynamic models of network formation that are based on myopic incentives to form links such as Jackson and Watts (2002) and Tercieux and Vannetelbosch (2006) .
These models aim to use the random process to select from the set of pairwise stable networks.
set with bargaining, it is non-empty. Part (a) of condition (iii) in De…nition 1 is the equal bargaining power property for farsighted players. It requires that for each pair of players linked in g both players su¤er or bene…t equally from being linked with respect to their respective bargaining threat. Part (b) of condition (iii) in De…nition 1 imposes a consistency requirement on the bargaining threat. When bargaining how to share the value at g, the bargaining threat z i (g) for each player i has to be such that the threat can be reached by a farsighted improving path emanating from some adjacent network to g when the adjacent network is not in G. That is,
which makes z i (g) a credible threat.
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Example 1 (continued). We observe that E(v) = ff12; 13gg is not a von NeumannMorgenstern farsightedly stable set with bargaining if y is the Myerson value allocation rule since external stability is violated. There is no farsighted improving path from the network f23g to the network f12; 13g if y is the Myerson value; players 2 and 3 obtain a higher payo¤ in f23g than in f12; 13g. Notice that the set ff23gg
is not a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with bargaining if y is the Myerson value because it violates equal bargaining power for farsighted players at networks where some players are linked to each other and v = 0. For instance, players 1 and 2 obtain both 0 at f12g but obtain, respectively, 0 and 2 at their consistent bargaining threat (z i (f12g) = f23g).
If y is the player-based ‡exible network allocation rule, then E(v) = ff12; 13gg is a not a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with bargaining even though internal stability, external stability and consistency in De…nition 1 are satis…ed. But, equal bargaining power for farsighted players is violated at networks where some players are linked to each other and v = 0. In general, equal bargaining power for farsighted players may be violated at any network. For instance,
where v 0 (f12g; f12g) = 2 and v 0 (f3g; f12g) = 0. The player-based ‡exible networks allocations for the di¤erent network con…gurations are given in Figure 2 . We observe that E(v) = ff12; 13gg satis…es internal stability, external stability and consistency, but equal bargaining power is now violated at all networks g 6 = f12; 13g included networks f12g and f23g.
However, E(v) = ff12; 13gg is a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with bargaining if y is the allocation rule given in Table 1 with 1=2 > " > 0. 17 Notice that we do not impose that each player chooses her best alternative among her credible threats.
f13; 23g; f12; 23g ; f12g f13g f23g f12; 13g f12; 13; 23g Table 1 is not the unique one that may arise with E(v) = ff12; 13gg when players are farsighted.
f13; 23g; f12; 23g ; f12g f13g f23g f12; 13g f12; 13; 23g For instance, the set E(v) = ff12; 13gg is also a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with bargaining if y is the allocation rule given in Table 2 with 1=3 > " > 0. This allocation rule leads to a division of the value of the e¢ cient network f12; 23g where player 3 obtains a larger share than player 2 even though players 2 and 3 are symmetric in f12; 23g. Proposition 1. Take any bargaining threat z. If y satis…es component e¢ ciency and equal bargaining power for farsighted players then y is such that
Proof. See the appendix. for all i 2 N , for all g 2 E(v) and g 0 = 2 E(v) since y is the egalitarian allocation rule and g is e¢ cient. Hence, there is a farsighted improving from any g 0 = 2 E(v)
to some g 2 E(v), and E(v) satis…es external stability. [Equal bargaining power]
and y i (g 00 ; v) = y j (g 00 ; v) for all i; j 2 N , for all g 00 = 2 E(v), we have that equal bargaining power for farsighted players is satis…ed for any z such that z i (g) 2 E(v)
for g 2 G.
[Consistency] Since there is a farsighted improving from any g 0 = 2 E(v) and that
convex, all components of any network g 2 E(v) lead to the same per-capita value.
Since y is the componentwise egalitarian allocation rule, equal bargaining power for farsighted players is satis…ed for any z such that
, there exists some z such that for all g 2 G and ij 2 g we have that
Thus, E(v) satis…es internal stability, external stability, equal bargaining power and consistency. It is the unique von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with bargaining if y is the componentwise egalitarian allocation rule because F (g) = ; for all g 2 E(v) (hence, external stability would be violated if not all
stability would be violated if some g 0 = 2 E(v) belong to G). 
(1) Suppose E(v) is a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with bargaining and is a singleton set. Then ,either it consists of the complete network or the empty network because v is anonymous. Since y is anonymous, we have equal sharing of the value of the e¢ cient network g 2 E(v). Component e¢ ciency, equal bargaining power and consistency imply that there is equal sharing of the value of each component among the members of the component for each g 0 = 2 E(v). 18 Hence, y is the componentwise egalitarian allocation rule.
(2) Suppose E(v) is a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with bargaining but is not a singleton set. Top convexity implies that all components 18 Equal bargaining power and consistency imply that the allocation rule is either the componentwise egalitarian allocation rule or the egalitarian allocation rule. But, the egalitarian allocation rule violates component e¢ ciency.
of any g 2 E(v) have the same per-capita value, and that all components of any First, we show that if y is the componentwise egalitarian allocation rule (i.e. " = 1=3) then E(v) is the unique von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with bargaining. We have F (;) = G n f;; f12; 13; 23gg; F (f13g) = F (f12g) = F (f23g) = F (f12; 13; 23g) = ff12; 13g; f12; 23g; f13; 23gg; and F (f12; 13g) = F (f12; 23g) = F (f13; 23g) = ;. Then, E(v) satis…es internal stability and external stability. The componentwise egalitarian allocation rule also satis…es equal bargaining power and consistency since there is a z such that z i (g) 2 E(v) for g 2 G and F (g) \ E(v) 6 = ; for all g = 2 E(v). Hence, E(v) is a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with bargaining. We now show that E(v) is the unique von NeumannMorgenstern farsightedly stable set with bargaining. Suppose that G is a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with bargaining. We have that E(v) G since F (g) = ; for all g 2 E(v); otherwise, G would violate external stability. In
Second, is E(v) a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with bargaining if the anonymous and component e¢ cient allocation rule is such that " 6 = 1=3
(0 < " < 1=3)? Then, equal bargaining power and consistency can still be satis…ed as well as external stability but internal stability is violated since now g 2 F (g 0 ),
for any g; g 0 2 E(v) (g 6 = g 0 ). Hence, once the allocation rule is determined jointly with the farsighted stability of the network and the value function is anonymous, component additive and top convex, the set of strongly e¢ cient networks is a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with bargaining only if the sharing of the value follows the componentwise egalitarian allocation rule.
The next question is whether some G 6 = E(v) can be a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with bargaining if y is anonymous and the value function is anonymous, component additive and top convex.
Example 2 (continued). If y is anonymous then candidate allocations to support a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with bargaining are given in Figure 3 . For " < 0, then ff12; 13; 23gg is the unique set to satisfy internal stability and external stability. But, the allocations for fij; ikg violate equal bargaining power because of the consistency requirement. For " = 0, then ffij; ikg; f12; 13; 23gg are the sets to satisfy internal stability and external stability. But, the allocations for fij; jkg and fik; jkg violate equal bargaining power because of the consistency requirement. For 0 < " < 1=3 and 1=3 < " 1=2, then ffij; ikgg are the sets to satisfy internal stability and external stability. But, the allocations for fijg, fikg, fij; jkg, fik; jkg, f12; 13; 23g violate equal bargaining power because of the consistency requirement. For 1=2 < ", then ffijg; f12; 13; 23gg are the sets to satisfy internal stability and external stability. But, the allocations for fij; jkg, fij; ikg Proof. See the appendix.
Pairwise farsighted stability with bargaining
We now incorporate the property of equal bargaining power for farsighted players into the original de…nition of a pairwise farsightedly stable set due to Herings,
Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2009). Formally, pairwise farsighted stability with
bargaining is de…ned as follows.
De…nition 2. A set of networks G G is pairwise farsightedly stable with bargaining if there exists an allocation rule y and a bargaining threat z such that
and y j (g 00 ; v) y j (g; v),
fg 000 g) \ G 6 = ; for some g 000 2 A j (g). Proof. Suppose G is a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with bargaining. Then, conditions (ii) and (iii) in De…nition 2 are trivially satis…ed for G.
Suppose Condition (i) in De…nition 2 is not satis…ed. Then there is g 2 G and a deviation to g 0 = 2 G such that every g 00 2 F (g 0 ) \ G defeats g. 19 In particular, it then follows that g 00 2 F (g); a contradiction, since by condition (i) in De…nition 1 there is no g 00 2 G with that property. Consequently, Condition (i) in De…nition 2 holds.
To verify condition (iv) in De…nition 2, suppose there is a proper subset G 0 G that satis…es conditions (i), (ii) and (iii). Let g be in G but not in G 0 . Then, For 0 < " 1=2, the set E(v) = ff12; 13g; f12; 23g; f13; 23gg is a pairwise farsightedly stable set with bargaining. External stability is satis…ed. Notice that pairwise farsighted stability with bargaining does not require internal stability. Equal bargaining power for farsighted players and consistency are satis…ed. For instance, in f12g the bargaining threat z 1 (f12g) and z 2 (f12g) can be respectively f12; 13g and f12; 23g (or simply f13; 23g for both players). Equal bargaining power is satis…ed since y 1 (f12g; v) y 1 (f12; 13g; v) = 2 3 + 2" = y 2 (f12g; v) y 2 (f12; 23g; v) (or y 1 (f12g; v) y 1 (f13; 23g; v) = 2 2 " = y 2 (f12g; v) y 2 (f13; 23g; v)) and consistency is satis…ed since z 1 (f12g); z 2 (f12g) 2 E(v) and z 1 (f12g); z 2 (f12g) 2 F (;).
and y j (g 0 ; v) y j (g; v) with at least one inequality holding strictly. 20 Grandjean, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2011) have shown that, if the allocation rule is exogenously given and is the componentwise egalitarian allocation rule, then the set of strongly e¢ cient networks is the unique pairwise farsightedly stable set if and only if the value function is top convex.
E(v) is minimal. Any subset of E(v) would violate equal bargaining power for " 6 = 1=3. Take ff12; 13g; f12; 23gg E(v). Then, equal bargaining power is violated at f13; 23g because player 3 obtains an allocation smaller or equal than the allocations of players 1 and 2 at f12; 13g and f12; 23g.
However, if all strongly e¢ cient networks are componentwise symmetric, then Proposition 3 holds for the pairwise farsighted stability with bargaining. A network g is said to be componentwise symmetric if every player belonging to the same component has the same number of links. Formally, g is componentwise symmetric
if for each h 2 C(g) we have that #N i (h) = #N j (h) for all i; j 2 N (h). Proof. See the appendix.
Discussion

The role of top convexity
We now look at an example where the value function does not satisfy top convexity.
We observe that von Neumann-Morgenstern farsighted stability with bargaining is less likely to sustain e¢ cient networks than pairwise farsighted stability with bargaining.
Example 3 Value function not top convex. Take N = f1; 2; 3g and the anonymous, component additive, and not top convex value function de…ned by v(f12; 13; 23g) =
, and v(;) = 0. We have depicted in Figure 4 the network con…gurations with anonymous and component e¢ cient allocation rules.
There is no von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with bargaining. The set ff12g; f13g; f23gg is a candidate but it violates internal stability. In addition, each set ffijgg violates equal bargaining power for farsighted players at, for instance, networks fikg, fjkg and f12; 13; 23g. But, ff12g; f13g; f23gg is a pairwise farsightedly stable set with bargaining only if " = 0.
It can be easily veri…ed that all conditions are satis…ed. It is minimal since any nonempty subset G ff12g; f13g; f23gg would satisfy all conditions except that equal bargaining power would be violated at g 2 ff12g; f13g; f23gg n G.
The sets ff12; 13g; f12; 23gg, ff12; 13g; f13; 23gg and ff12; 23g; f13; 23gg are pairwise farsightedly stable sets with bargaining. External stability, equal bargaining power, consistency and minimality are satis…ed. But, they are not von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets with bargaining because internal stability is violated.
There is a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with bargaining only if " = 1=6. If " = 1=6, then G 0 = ff12g; f13g; f23g; f12; 13; 23gg is a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with bargaining. This set G 0 satis…es internal and external stability, equal bargaining power and consistency.
Equal bargaining power requires that at f12; 13g we have y 1 (f12g; v) y 1 (f12; 13g; v) = y 3 (f12g; v) y 3 (f12; 13g; v). Since y 1 (f12g; v) y 1 (f12; 13g; v) = 1=2 4=9 2" and y 3 (f12g; v) y 3 (f12; 13g; v) = 0 4=9 + ", equal bargaining power holds only if " = 1=6. Obviously, G 0 with " = 1=6 is also a pairwise farsightedly stable set with bargaining. However, G 0 is not the unique one. The set E(v) [ f12; 13; 23g is a pairwise farsightedly stable set with bargaining for 1=36 " < 4=9.
Hence, contrary to pairwise farsighted stability with bargaining, von NeumannMorgenstern farsighted stability with bargaining only leads to the emergence of ine¢ cient networks.
The role of equal bargaining power
We now reconsider Example 2 to show that if the allocation rule y does not satisfy anonymity and/or equal bargaining power, then the componentwise egalitarian allocation does not emerge in the long run. Given a vector w = (w 1 ; :::; w n ) 0, an allocation rule y satis…es w-weighted bargaining power 21 for farsighted players if for all v 2 V, for all g 2 G, for all ij 2 g,
Consider the de…nition of von Neumann-Morgenstern farsighted stability with bargaining where the equal bargaining power condition (iiia) is replaced by the wweighted bargaining power condition (iiia 0 ). Suppose that (w 1 ; w 2 ; w 3 ) is such that
is still a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with bargaining where players share equally the value for each network g 2 E(v) while they share unequally the value for each nonempty network g = 2 E(v) (the allocations for = 2 are given in Table 3 ). Since each player obtains the same allocation in each e¢ cient star network, the property of weighted bargaining power forces the players to agree on asymmetric allocations at symmetric networks. It can be easily veri…ed that internal stability, external stability and consistency are satis…ed too.
; f12g f13g f23g f12; 13g f12; 23g f13; 23g f12; 13; 23g Table 3 : Allocations satisfying w-weighted bargaining power for = 2
Hence, the property of equal bargaining power for farsighted players is a tight condition for having the componentwise egalitarian allocation rule arising endogenously.
The role of divergent bargaining threats
The de…nitions of von Neumann-Morgenstern and pairwise farsighted stability with bargaining require that bargaining threats are credible but allow players to hold divergent credible bargaining threats. That is, two players who are bargaining over 21 Such an allocation rule is called w-fairness in Dutta and Mutuswami (1997) .
how to share the bene…ts of being linked may disagree about the network that would be formed in case they do not reach an agreement.
We now reconsider Example 3 to illustrate the role of allowing players to hold divergent credible threats. Let " = 1=36. Then ff12; 13g; f12; 23gg is a pairwise farsightedly stable set with bargaining. Suppose now that players hold common bargaining threats if possible. Hence, when the players bargain at the complete network f12; 13; 23g they hold either f12; 13g or f12; 23g as common credible threat.
Take f12; 13g as common credible threat at f12; 13; 23g. If v and y are anonymous, then " cannot be equal to 1=36; otherwise, players would have to share unequally the value at the complete network.
Thus, it seems reasonable to conjecture that requiring common bargaining threats if possible would make more likely the emergence of allocation rules that are not anonymous. For instance, ff12; 13g; f12; 23gg is not a pairwise farsightedly stable set when the allocations are those given in Figure 4 for " = 1=36, but it is a pairwise farsightedly stable set with bargaining for the allocations given in Table 4 .
f12; 13g
; f12g f13g f23g f13; 23g f12; 23g f12; 13; 23g 
The role of component additivity
Component additivity (or no externalities across components) means that the value of a component of the network does not depend on the structure of the network outside the component. We now look at situations where externalities across components can arise and we provide an alternative condition to top convexity such that the set of e¢ cient networks remains the unique von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with bargaining. A value function v is link monotonic (Navarro, 2013b) if for any S 2 (g) and any ij 2 gj S we have
with j 2 S 00 , and S 0 \ S 00 = ;;
A value function v satis…es strong critical-link monotonicity (Navarro, 2013b) if v is link monotonic and if for any g, any S 2 (g) and any ij 2 gj S such that # (g) = # (g ij) 1 we have v(S; g)=#S > maxfv(S 0 ; g ij)=#S 0 ; v(S 00 ; g ij)=#S 00 g where S 0 2 (g ij) with i 2 S 0 and S 00 2 (g ij) with j 2 S 00 . The link ij is said to be critical. That is, if it is severed, then the component that it was a part of will become two components (or one of the nodes will become disconnected). Strong critical-link monotonicity imposes that if we add a link to the network such that two components become connected then the per-capita value of the new component is greater than the per-capita value of any of the two component before adding the link.
Proposition 7.
Consider any value function that satis…es anonymity and strong critical-link monotonicity. Suppose that y is component e¢ cient and anonymous.
The set fg N g is the unique von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with bargaining if and only if y is the componentwise egalitarian allocation rule.
Proof. See the appendix.
Thus, if the value function satis…es anonymity and strong critical-link monotonicity and the allocation rule satis…es component e¢ cient and anonymous, then the strongly e¢ cient network is likely to emerge in the long run together with the componentwise egalitarian allocation rule when players are farsighted. In addition, Navarro (2013b) has shown that there exists a forward-looking network formation process consisting of an allocation rule and a transition probability matrix such that the allocation rule is component e¢ cient and the complete network is the only absorbing state of the transition probability matrix for any strictly positive common discount factor.
Conclusion
We have studied the stability of social and economic networks when farsighted players simultaneously form links and bargain over allocations. In particular, we have shown that the set of strongly e¢ cient networks is the unique von NeumannMorgenstern farsightedly stable set with bargaining if the allocation rule is anonymous and component e¢ cient and the value function is top convex. In addition, the componentwise egalitarian allocation rule emerges endogenously.
Summing up for all j 2 S (j 6 = i) such that S 2 (g) and i 2 S, we have
Since y satis…es the component e¢ ciency property, i.e. P j2S2 (g) y j (g; v) = v(S; g), we have that
Hence,
Proof of Proposition 4.
Suppose that y is anonymous and component e¢ cient and v is anonymous, component additive and top convex. We will show that there is no von NeumannMorgenstern farsightedly stable set with bargaining G 6 = E(v). (ib) Suppose that #G > 1. Internal stability for G implies that players obtain the same allocation in any g 2 G. Then, equal bargaining power and consistency imply that, in any g 0 = 2 G, members of each component share equally the value of each component. Furthermore, top convexity of the value function implies that g = 2 F (g 00 ) for all g 00 2 E(v) and g 2 G. Hence, G fails to satisfy external stability and we have a contradiction.
(ii) Take G such that G \ E(v) 6 = ;, G 6 = E(v) and G is von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with bargaining.
(iia) Suppose that G = fgg. Notice that g is a strongly e¢ cient network, to lead to a higher per capita value than the average which would contradict top convexity). Then, since G = fgg E(v), there is g 00 2 E(v), g 00 6 = g, such that g = 2 F (g 00 ). Hence, G fails to satisfy external stability and we have a contradiction.
(iib) Suppose that #G > 1. First, consider the case G ! E(v). Internal stability for G implies that players obtain the same allocation in any g; g 0 2 G, but this is not possible since by top convexity g 2 G \ E(v) Pareto dominates g 0 2 G n E(v).
Hence, G fails to satisfy internal stability and we have a contradiction. Second, consider the case G E(v). Internal stability for G implies that players obtain the same allocation in any g 2 G, and is satis…ed since v is top convex. Then, equal bargaining power and consistency imply that, in any g 0 = 2 G, members of each component share equally the value of each component. But there is g 0 = 2 G such that g 0 2 E(v). Top convexity of the value function implies that there is no g 2 G such that g 2 F (g 0 ) for any g 0 = 2 G, g 0 2 E(v). Hence, G fails to satisfy external stability and we have a contradiction. Third, consider the case G + E(v) and G * E(v).
Similar arguments lead to a contradiction. 
Proof of Proposition 7.
Take any value function v that satis…es anonymity and strong critical-link monotonicity. Navarro (2013b) has shown that if v satis…es strong critical-link monotonicity, then the complete network g N is the unique strongly e¢ cient network. Suppose y is component e¢ cient and anonymous. We will show that E(v) = fg N g is a von
Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with bargaining if and only if y is the componentwise egalitarian allocation rule. 
